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SUBSTITUTED SERVICE AND THE HAGUE SERVICE
CONVENTION

WILLIAM S. DODGE*
ABSTRACT
State law plays a surprisingly large role in transnational litigation, and how it defines the applicability of the Hague Service
Convention is an important example. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Convention does not apply when, under state law, service of process is
made within the United States. In Schlunk, Illinois law permitted
substituted service on the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent
company, so the Convention did not apply. This Article looks at
substituted service under state law today and when it permits avoidance of the Hague Convention. The Article focuses on two kinds of

* Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law and John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law,
University of California, Davis, School of Law. This paper could not have been written without the outstanding research assistance of Joshua O’Brien who carefully examined the
statutes and cases in each of the fifty states. My thanks also to Pamela Bookman, Hannah
Buxbaum, John Coyle, Robin Effron, Ted Folkman, Maggie Gardner, Alyssa King, and Aaron
Simowitz for their comments, suggestions, and insights.
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substituted service that many states permit: (1) substituted service on
affiliated companies; and (2) substituted service on state officials.
The Article argues that states should liberalize their rules for
substituted service on affiliated companies by focusing on whether
service on the affiliate provides adequate notice to the defendant
rather than on whether there are grounds to pierce the corporate
veil, as many states currently do. The Article further argues that
when substituted service is made on a state official, the Due Process
Clauses require that a copy of the service be sent abroad, making the
Hague Convention applicable.
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INTRODUCTION
First year courses in Civil Procedure typically focus on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related federal doctrines and
statutes. But state law plays an important role in civil litigation, including transnational litigation, even in federal courts. Under the
Erie doctrine, for example, state law governs the conflict of laws and
the enforcement of foreign judgments.1 The Federal Rules expressly incorporate state rules on personal jurisdiction.2 The same is true
for service of process, including service on defendants located
abroad. Although Federal Rule 4(f) governs service in a foreign
country,3 Federal Rule 4(e)(1) alternatively permits service within
the United States by “following state law for serving a summons in
an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where
the district court is located or where service is made.”4 As this Article discusses, state statutes on substituted service often permit
service within the state even when the defendant is located abroad.5
When a foreign defendant is located in a country that has joined
the Hague Service Convention, an additional set of rules and procedures come into play.6 This treaty interacts with state law in two
1. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state conflicts rules); DeJoria v. Maghreb
Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that state law governs the
enforcement of foreign-country judgments); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 reporters’ note 1 (AM. L. INST. 2018) (discussing
law governing enforcement of foreign-country judgments).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who
is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district
court is located”).
3. Rule 4(f) applies to service on individuals, but Rule 4(h)(2) extends most of its
provisions to corporations.
4. Although Rule 4(e)(1) applies to service on individuals, Rule 4(h)(1)(A) extends its
provisions to corporations.
5. See infra Parts III-IV.
6. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Hague Service Convention]. In addition to the United States, seventy-eight
countries are currently parties to the Hague Service Convention, including Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom, which is to say, most of the United States’ largest trading partners. See
Status Table: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH (June 17, 2021), https://www.hcch.
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important ways. On the one hand, as the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the Convention
“pre-empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law
in all cases to which it applies.”7 But on the other hand, state law
defines the applicability of the Convention. By its terms, the
Convention applies only “where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”8 The Supreme
Court held that this question turns on “the internal law of the forum
state.”9 In Schlunk, Illinois law provided that a foreign parent
company could be served by substituted service on its U.S. subsidiary.10 Because service on the foreign company’s agent was completed within the United States, there was no occasion to transmit
documents for service abroad, and the Convention did not apply.11
This Article contributes to the growing literature on the role of
state law in transnational litigation12 by examining substituted
service under state law today and when it allows parties to avoid
the Hague Service Convention.13 The Article focuses on two kinds of
substituted service. The first is the kind found in Schlunk, service
on an affiliated U.S. company as an involuntary agent of the foreign

net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 [https://perma.cc/9DPD-EZ4G] [hereinafter Status Table]. For an overview of the Convention, see GEORGE A. BERMANN, WILLIAM S.
DODGE & DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 297-303
(2d ed. 2021).
7. 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
8. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
9. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700.
10. Id. at 706.
11. Id. at 707-08.
12. See, e.g., Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and
General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609 (2015); John F.
Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV. 631 (2017);
William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality in State Law, 53 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1389 (2020); Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey,
After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law,
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013).
13. It is also possible for the parties to the contract to avoid the Hague Convention by
appointing an agent for service of process in the United States or by waiving formal service
of process under state law, as the California Supreme Court recently held. See Rockefeller
Tech. Invs. (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Tech. Co., 460 P.3d 764, 776 (Cal. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 374 (2020). For an excellent discussion of these issues, see John F. Coyle,
Robin J. Effron & Maggie Gardner, Contracting Around the Hague Service Convention, 53
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2019).
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defendant.14 Most states that have considered the question allow the
use of affiliated companies as involuntary agents for service only
when there are grounds for piercing the corporate veil.15 But courts
in important states like California, Illinois, and Massachusetts have
followed more liberal approaches that focus on whether the defendant is likely to receive notice.16
The second kind of substituted service involves service on a state
official—typically, the secretary of state—as an agent of the foreign
corporation.17 Statutes authorizing such service usually require
either the state official or the plaintiff to send a copy of the process
to the defendant, and many courts have held that such a requirement to transmit documents abroad makes the Hague Service Convention applicable.18 Some courts, however, have interpreted such
statutes to provide that service is complete when the state official
is served, making the Convention inapplicable.19 These decisions are
problematic both because they replicate the practice of notification
au parquet that the Convention aimed to eliminate20 and because
they raise questions of constitutionally adequate notice.21
Part I begins with an overview of the Hague Service Convention,
its interpretation in Schlunk, and the rules that govern service of
process in state and federal courts. Part II reviews the due process
requirements of adequate notice articulated in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.22 and considers their implications for
substituted service. Part III reviews state laws permitting substituted service on affiliated companies as involuntary agents. It
argues that veil piercing is too restrictive a test for determining
whether an affiliated company should be deemed an agent for
14. In corporate law, companies may be affiliated in a number of different ways. Most of
the cases considered below involved service on a subsidiary as an involuntary agent of a
parent company. This Article uses the term “affiliated companies” rather than “subsidiary”
because it is possible that service on a company other than a subsidiary might provide
constitutionally adequate notice. By the same token, it is also possible that service on a
subsidiary might be constitutionally inadequate.
15. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra notes 123, 129, 134, 139, 141-60 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
22. 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950).
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service of process and that courts should focus instead on whether
service on the U.S. affiliate will provide constitutionally adequate
notice to the foreign defendant. Part IV turns to state laws permitting substituted service on state officials. It argues that the Due
Process Clauses require either the state official or the plaintiff to
transmit a copy of the process to the foreign defendant even when
state law does not, making the Convention applicable in all such
cases. Part V briefly concludes.
I. THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
The Hague Service Convention aims “to ensure that judicial and
extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the
notice of the addressee in sufficient time” and to “simplify[ ] and
expedit[e] the procedure.”23 To accomplish these aims, the Convention requires each state-party to designate a Central Authority to
receive requests for service.24 Upon receiving a request, the Central
Authority serves the document in accordance with the receiving
state’s own law25 and sends a certificate of service to the applicant.26
The Convention permits service by other means, including diplomatic and consular agents and postal channels, so long as the
receiving state has not objected to these.27 And service may be made
through any other method that is permitted under the law of the
receiving state for documents coming from abroad.28
The Convention’s fundamental concern that the addressee receive actual notice is reflected in two provisions on default judgments. Article 15 provides that a court shall not enter a default
judgment unless (1) the document was served by a method the receiving country uses for domestic actions, (2) the document was
actually delivered to the defendant by another method provided in
the Convention, or (3) the document was transmitted by a method
23. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.
24. Id. art. 2.
25. Id. art. 5. The applicant may request a particular method so long as it is consistent
with the receiving state’s law. Id.
26. Id. art. 6.
27. Id. arts. 8, 10. For the reservations and declarations of each state, see generally Status Table, supra note 6.
28. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, art. 19.
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provided in the Convention and at least six months have elapsed.29
Article 16 provides relief from a default judgment if the defendant
did not have knowledge of the document served and has a prima
facie defense on the merits.30 But of course these provisions guarding against default judgments without notice apply only if the Convention itself applies.31
The Hague Convention applies “in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.”32 In Schlunk, the Supreme
Court held that this question “must be determined by reference to
the law of the forum state.”33 Illinois permitted substituted service
on a foreign corporation, allowing a plaintiff to use the defendant’s
domestic subsidiary as an “involuntary agent” for service.34 Under
the Due Process Clause, service must provide “notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.”35 But the Court concluded that “[w]here
service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state
law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications.”36
The defendant in Schlunk argued that if forum law determined
the applicability of the Convention, “countries could circumvent the
Convention by defining methods of service of process that do not
require transmission of documents abroad.”37 In particular, such an
29. Id. art. 15.
30. Id. art. 16.
31. See HCCH, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE SERVICE CONVENTION
¶ 10 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter PRACTICAL HANDBOOK] (“[I]t goes without saying that the
protection offered by Articles 15 and 16 only operates when the Convention is applicable,
which is only the case when a document must be transmitted for service abroad.”).
32. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. The Convention does not apply when
the address of the person to be served is not known. Id.
33. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 701 (1988).
34. Id. at 696; see also id. at 697 (describing Illinois decisions). For more on Illinois law,
see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. Other countries have similarly interpreted the
applicability of the Convention to turn on forum law, and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference agrees with this interpretation. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 31, ¶¶ 3047.
35. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)).
36. Id. at 707. For discussion of what due process requires, see infra Part II.
37. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 703.
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interpretation would allow notification au parquet, a method of
service used in some civil-law countries under which service is made
by depositing documents with a government official.38 The Court
had no doubt that the Convention’s drafters wanted to eliminate
notification au parquet.39 But the question of substituted service on
government officials was not before the Court, and there was no
similar indication in the drafting history that the Convention was
intended to eliminate substituted service on subsidiaries.40 Finally,
the Court expressed doubt “that this country, or any other country,
will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the
Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit
judicial documents for service abroad.”41
The Federal Rules on service abroad are designed to work in
tandem with the Hague Service Convention. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(h)(2) governs the service of corporations outside the
United States and permits all of the means available for serving
individuals abroad under Rule 4(f) except personal service.42 Rule
4(f)(1) authorizes service by “internationally agreed means” and
refers specifically to the Hague Convention.43 Rule 4(f)(2) applies if
there is no treaty or the treaty permits other means of service and
is limited to means of service prescribed by foreign law, directed by
a foreign authority, or at least not prohibited by foreign law.44 And
Rule 4(f)(3) allows courts to order other means of service, but only
if they are “not prohibited by international agreement.”45 Several
states have adopted rules modeled on Federal Rule 4(f) for service
of process abroad.46

38. Id. (listing France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, and Italy as countries
permitting notification au parquet). For discussion of similar statutes in the United States,
see infra Part IV.A.
39. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 703.
40. Id. at 704.
41. Id. at 705.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(2).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2).
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
46. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.4; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(d)(13) (limited to service on
individuals); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.2(i)-(k); NEV. R. CIV. P. 4.3(b)(1)-(3); N.D. R. CIV. P. 4(f); R.I. R.
CIV. P. 4(g) (limited to service on individuals); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-4(d)(9) (2021); TENN.
R. CIV. P. 4A; UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4); WYO. R. CIV. P. 4(f), (h)(3).
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But substituted service on an affiliated company or a government
official does not occur abroad—it occurs in the United States, which
is why it may potentially avoid the Hague Service Convention.47 In
federal courts, Federal Rule 4(h)(1) governs the service of corporations within the United States, and it authorizes service in
accordance with state law, as for individuals under Rule 4(e)(1).48 As
Parts III and IV discuss, many states permit substituted service on
affiliated companies in the United States, substituted service on
government officials, or both.49 Thus, state rules on substituted
service apply to actions brought in federal court as well as to those
brought in state court.
But in the United States, service of process has a constitutional
dimension as well. Under the Due Process Clauses, as Schlunk
noted, “substituted service [must] provide[ ] ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.’”50 Schlunk conditioned its holding that the
Hague Convention did not apply in that case on the fact that service
was “valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process
Clause.”51 So, before turning to what state law permits, it is worth
considering what due process requires.
II. NOTICE UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
The seminal case on notice under the Due Process Clauses is
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.52 In that case, a
trustee had given notice regarding a judicial settlement of accounts
to a trust’s beneficiaries by publication in a local newspaper, as

47. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707-08 (1988).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4(h)(1)(B) additionally permits service on an officer,
managing or general agent, or “any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(B). As discussed below, many states make
affiliated companies or government officials involuntary agents for service. In this respect,
subsection (1)(B) simply duplicates subsection (1)(A).
49. See infra Parts III-IV.
50. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)).
51. Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
52. 339 U.S. 306.
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permitted by New York’s banking law.53 The Supreme Court held
that due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”54 But the Court cautioned that the constitutional determination must be made “with due regard for the practicalities and
peculiarities of the case.”55 In Mullane itself, the Court distinguished between beneficiaries with known addresses and those
without.56 For those without known addresses, the Court found
notice by publication constitutionally sufficient because there were
no better choices.57 But for those with known addresses, the Court
held that necessity could not justify notice by publication because
the mail furnished a reasonable alternative.58
How might Mullane’s notice requirement apply to substituted
service? The Supreme Court in Schlunk seemed to think that
service on an affiliated company could be constitutionally sufficient.59 The Illinois Court of Appeals had concluded that “the
relationship between [Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG)]
and [Volkswagen of America (VWoA)] is so close that it is certain
that VWAG ‘was fully apprised of the pendency of the action’ by
delivery of the summons to VWoA.”60 The parent company in
Schlunk did not dispute that it had received constitutionally
adequate notice.61 And the Supreme Court, after stating that the
53. Id. at 309.
54. Id. at 314.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 317-18.
57. Id. (“However great the odds that publication will never reach the eyes of such
unknown parties, it is not in the typical case much more likely to fail than any of the choices
open to legislators endeavoring to prescribe the best notice practicable.”).
58. Id. at 318 (“Where the names and post office addresses of those affected by a
proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails
to apprise them of its pendency.”).
59. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707-08 (1988).
60. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (quoting Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, 466 N.E.2d 217, 233 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984)).
61. The parent company argued only that “[a]bsent a presumption that service will be
transmitted to the defendant abroad, substituted service on a domestic ‘involuntary agent’
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Brief for Petitioner at
22, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (No. 86-1052), 1987
WL 881152, at *22.
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Convention would be inapplicable only if service were “valid and
complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause,”62 held
that “the Hague Service Convention does not apply.”63 In sum, for
service on affiliated companies, the constitutional question is whether the relationship between the defendant and its affiliate served as
an involuntary agent is sufficiently close that substituted service is
reasonably calculated to provide notice to the defendant.64
Substituted service on state officials is different. State officials
have no preexisting relationships with foreign defendants that
would make them likely to send the defendants copies of the service
unless required to do so.65 The Hague Convention applies only when
the address of the person to be served is known.66 In such cases, the
Hague Convention’s procedures become available alternatives.67
Just as service by publication was considered constitutionally
insufficient in Mullane when service by mail was an option,68
substituted service on a state official with no obligation to send the
service to the defendant is constitutionally insufficient when using
the Convention is an option.69 In sum, substituted service on a state
official would seem to satisfy due process only if the plaintiff or the
state official is required to send a copy of the service to the defendant abroad. That constitutional obligation makes the Hague
Convention applicable.
There is, however, a possible wrinkle in this analysis. Foreign
corporations are often required by state law to register to do
business in the state and to appoint and maintain an agent for
service of process.70 When a foreign corporation fails to appoint or
maintain an agent for service, one might argue that the foreign
corporation is to blame for its failure to receive notice. The Supreme
62. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 707.
63. Id. at 708.
64. See id. at 707-08.
65. See Quinn v. Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147, 154 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (“It is obvious that
merely serving the Secretary of State, without the necessary mailing to the nonresident
defendant, will not apprise the defendant of the pendency of the action.”).
66. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, art. 1 (“This Convention shall not apply
where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.”).
67. See id.
68. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69. See Quinn, 700 A.2d at 154.
70. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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Court embraced such an argument in Washington ex rel. Bond &
Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, a pre-Mullane case,
upholding the constitutionality of substituted service on a state official who did not give notice to the defendant, a foreign corporation
that had registered to do business in the state of Washington and
then withdrawn.71 The Court reasoned:
By appointing a new agent when [its registered agent] ceased to
be a resident of the State the appellant could have assured itself
of notice of any action. The statute informed the company that
if it elected not to appoint a successor ... the Secretary of State
would by law become its agent for the purpose of service. The
burden lay upon the appellant to make such arrangement for
notice as was thought desirable. There is no denial of due
process in the omission to require the corporation’s agent to give
it such notice.72

As described in Part IV, some states today—Maryland, New Mexico,
and New York—distinguish between registered foreign corporations
that are required to appoint an agent for service and unregistered
foreign corporations that are not, providing that sending a copy of
the process to the defendant is not required to complete service in
the case of registered corporations.73
But it is doubtful that Bond & Goodwin & Tucker remains good
law and that the distinction that these states draw between registered and unregistered corporations is constitutional. First, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the argument, on which
that decision rests, that no due process violation occurs if the defendant could have protected itself by making other arrangements for
notice.74 Second, the case was decided before Mullane, which held
71. 289 U.S. 361, 366 (1933).
72. Id. at 365.
73. See infra notes 169-78, 185-91 and accompanying text. In fact, the New Mexico
Supreme Court relied on Bond & Goodwin & Tucker to hold that service on a corporation
authorized to do business was effective despite the Secretary of State’s failure to send the
defendant a copy of the process. Silva v. Crombie & Co., 44 P.2d 719, 720-21 (N.M. 1935). The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals in turn relied on Silva to hold that due process did not
require the state official to send a copy of the process to a foreign corporation required to
maintain an agent in order for service to be effective. Rhema, LLC v. Foresite, LLC, No. 1274,
2015 WL 6951145, at *7-9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 10, 2015).
74. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006) (“The Commissioner does not argue that
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the constitutional adequacy of notice must be determined by considering the available alternatives.75 The fact that a foreign
corporation has failed to maintain a required agent in the state does
not make service through the Hague Convention any more difficult
or any less of an alternative. And, as noted above, when the defendant’s address is known and the Convention’s procedures are
available, service on a state official not obligated to transmit that
service to the defendant becomes as unreasonable as service by
publication was in Mullane.76
III. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON AFFILIATED COMPANIES
In Schlunk, Illinois courts held that the plaintiff could effectuate
service on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary
even though the foreign corporation had not appointed the subsidiary as its agent for service.77 As summarized in Table 1 below,
courts in twenty-four states have considered whether an affiliated
company may be used as an involuntary agent for service of
process.78 In three states, courts have rejected the possibility. In
twenty-one states, courts permit substituted service on affiliated
companies, but they have adopted different standards. Courts in
eighteen states use some version of a veil-piercing test. But courts
in three states—California, Illinois, and Massachusetts—have
followed a more liberal approach focusing on whether substituted
service on an affiliated company is likely to provide notice to the
defendant.79 This Part argues that the more liberal approach is the
better one.

Jones’ failure to comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address updated forfeits his
right to constitutionally sufficient notice, and we agree.”); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799-800 (1983) (noting that “a party’s ability to take steps to safeguard
its interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation”).
75. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
77. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1054 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986).
78. The table includes decisions by federal courts because the federal courts were applying
state law. However, when the classification relied solely on federal court decisions, that fact
is noted with an “FC.”
79. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
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Table 1. Substituted Service on Affiliates

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

Permitted
Permitted
(Veil Piercing) (Notice)
X

Rejected

Not
Addressed
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FC
X
FC
X
X
X
X
FC
X
X
X
X
X
X

1500
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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X
X

FC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FC
X
X
X
X

The twenty-four states in which courts have considered whether
an affiliated company may be used as an involuntary agent for
service of process may be divided into three groups. In the first
group are three states where courts have rejected the possibility:
state courts in Georgia80 and New Jersey,81 and federal courts in
Michigan.82
In the second group are eighteen states in which courts have accepted the possibility of substituted service on affiliated companies
but have limited such service to cases in which there are grounds for
piercing the corporate veil. This group includes state courts in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi,
80. Rovema Verpackungsmaschinen v. Deloach, 500 S.E.2d 647, 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(“Neither Georgia’s general service of process statute (OCGA § 9-11-4) nor the corporate
service statute (OCGA § 14-2-504) authorizes service on an agent of a domestic subsidiary as
constituting proper service on the foreign parent corporation.”).
81. Gapanovich v. Komori Corp., 605 A.2d 1120, 1123 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“In
New Jersey, such service is not effective.”).
82. Lafarge Corp. v. Altech Env’t USA, 220 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“No
provision within [Michigan] Rule 105 allows service on a parent corporation to be achieved
by delivery of process to its subsidiary.”); see also Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 19-10485, 2020 WL 3893038, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2020)
(quoting Lafarge, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 832).
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New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin as well as federal courts in Maryland,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Virginia.83 The standards for piercing the
corporate veil vary from state to state.84 To decide whether an
affiliated company may be used as an involuntary agent for service
of process, some of these states ask whether the parent company
exercises such control that its subsidiary “operates merely as a
department of the parent corporation”85 or that the subsidiary’s
activities “were in fact the activities of the parent.”86 Others
consider whether the subsidiary is the “alter ego” of the parent87 or
whether other reasons exist to pierce the corporate veil.88
Some of the courts that have followed a veil-piercing approach
have relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., which held that “use of a
subsidiary does not necessarily subject the parent corporation to the

83. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
84. See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 101-1007 (2020-21
ed.) (discussing all fifty states’ laws for piercing the corporate veil). Procedural differences
among the states, such as pleading standards, threshold presumptions, and burdens of proof,
may also make a difference in the successfulness of veil piercing. See Sam F. Halabi, VeilPiercing’s Procedure, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1001 (2015). Empirical studies have also found
substantial variation in veil piercing from state to state. See Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89
TEX. L. REV. 81, 115-16 tbl.6 (2010); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1051 tbl.6 (1991).
85. Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala. 1983) (quoting
Pro. Invs. Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 698 (D. Kan. 1978)); accord Racusin v.
Monteco, Inc., No. 01-95-00271-CV, 1996 WL 443730, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1996);
Stoehr v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763, 766 (D. Neb. 1977); Farha v. Signal Cos.,
532 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Kan. 1975); Taca Int’l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of Eng., Ltd., 204
N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1965).
86. Aquila Steel Corp. v. Fontana, 585 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Atkiengelselischaft v. McCurdy, 340 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976)); accord Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Maynard, 437 S.E.2d 277, 283 (W. Va. 1993); Gen. Fin.
Corp. v. Skinner, 426 N.E.2d 77, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Brooks v. Int’l Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, 114 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Minn. 1962).
87. Tanfield Eng’g Sys., Inc. v. Thornton, 97 So. 3d 694, 699 (Miss. 2012); Cruttenden v.
Mantura, 640 P.2d 932, 934-35 (N.M. 1982); Rothchild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp., Inc., No.
6239, 1981 WL 7624, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1981); Del. Valley Surgical Supply Co. v. Geriatric & Med. Ctrs., Inc., 299 A.2d 237, 239 (Pa. 1973).
88. Conservatorship of Prom v. Sumitomo Rubber Indus., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Nw. Magnesite Co., 182 P.2d 643, 664 (Wash. 1947); see also Sanyal
v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 14-cv-906, 2014 WL 4925842, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2014);
Corraro v. Moody Int’l, No. 11–CV–0455, 2012 WL 3061476, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 26, 2012);
Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (D. Md. 2011).
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jurisdiction.”89 This is ironic. Cannon was careful to distinguish veil
piercing in the context of personal jurisdiction from questions of
service and substantive liability.90 But the eighteen veil-piercing
states seem to assume that the test for piercing the corporate veil
should be the same no matter whether the question is substantive
liability, jurisdiction, or service of process.
Courts in three states have followed a more liberal approach to
substituted service on affiliated companies. One of these states is
Illinois, whose courts held in Schlunk that a domestic subsidiary
could be used to serve a foreign corporation, thereby avoiding the
Hague Service Convention.91 In concluding that Volkswagen of
America (VWoA) could be treated as an agent for serving its parent
Volkswagen AG (VWAG), the Illinois Court of Appeals relied on a
number of factors, including that the subsidiary was wholly owned
by the parent, that it existed to promote sales of the parent’s
products, that the parent extensively controlled the subsidiary’s
activities, and that the parent dominated the subsidiary’s board of
directors.92 The court concluded that “the relationship between
VWAG and VWoA is so close that it is certain that VWAG ‘was fully
apprised of the pendency of the action’ by delivery of the summons
to VWoA.”93
89. 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925); see, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 437 S.E.2d at 283 (citing Cannon,
267 U.S. at 336); Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d at 884 (same);
Stoehr, 429 F. Supp. at 766 (same); Nw. Magnesite Co., 182 P.2d at 664 (same). On the
influence of Cannon today, see John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert
Personal Jurisdiction over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine,
84 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2004).
90. Cannon noted that “[t]he objection to the maintenance of the suit is not procedural—as
where it is sought to defeat a suit against a foreign corporation on the ground that process has
been served upon one not authorized to act as its agent.” 267 U.S. at 335. Rather, “[t]he
question is simply whether the corporate separation carefully maintained must be ignored in
determining the existence of jurisdiction.” Id. at 336. The Court also distinguished cases
involving substantive liability on the ground that there was “no attempt to hold the defendant
liable for an act or omission of its subsidiary or to enforce as against the latter a liability of
the defendant.” Id. at 337.
91. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1053-54 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986), aff’d, 486 U.S. 694 (1988); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
92. Schlunk, 503 N.E.2d at 1053. Subsequent decisions have multiplied the number of
factors. See, e.g., Chung v. Tarom, S.A., 990 F. Supp. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (listing thirteen
factors); Wissmiller v. Lincoln Trail Motosports, Inc., 552 N.E.2d 295, 298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(listing seven factors).
93. Schlunk, 503 N.E.2d at 1053 (quoting Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Can., 466
N.E.2d 217, 233 (Ill. 1984)).
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The Illinois court in Schlunk distinguished its approach from
veil-piercing states that “have looked to whether a subsidiary is an
alter-ego or mere department of its parent.”94 And a subsequent
decision confirmed that, for service under Illinois law, “it is not
necessary that a parent’s control of a subsidiary be so pervasive as
to make the two corporations essentially one, or to make the subsidiary an alter ego or a mere department of the parent.”95
Courts in Massachusetts have also asked whether service on the
subsidiary will provide notice to the parent. The Massachusetts
Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service within the Commonwealth upon a foreign corporation by delivering the summons and
complaint “to a managing or general agent.”96 In Heffernan v.
Robeco Investment Management, Inc., the Superior Court read this
provision to require “a sufficiently close relationship between a
United States entity and a foreign entity such that service upon the
United States agent is sufficient to provide notice to the foreign
defendant.”97 After noting that “[a] mere parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient,” the court listed factors to consider, including:
whether the resident entity performs all the functions for the
foreign entity that the foreign entity would if it were doing
business in the state by its own officials, the extent of common
ownership and common officers, and generally the extent to
which the foreign entity operates in the forum through the
resident entity.98

Because there was “a close relationship,” the court found that
service on the parent by service on the subsidiary was proper and
that the Hague Service Convention did not apply.99
94. Id. at 1054.
95. Wissmiller, 552 N.E.2d at 298.
96. MASS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2).
97. No. 07-2116-BLS2, 2007 WL 3244422, at *10 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2007) (quoting
Sankaran v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., No. 97 Civ. 8318, 1998 WL 433780, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 1998)).
98. Id. The court noted that “[t]he factual determination that is necessary for this purpose
is closely related to the factual determination that governs personal jurisdiction.” Id.
99. Id. In Sionyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., the district court applied the test
articulated in Heffernan, concluding that there was not a sufficiently close relationship and
that service under the Hague Convention was required. No. 15-13488, 2016 WL 4007558, at
*5-7 (D. Mass. July 26, 2016). The court rejected the argument that only actual notice was
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In California, service on a foreign corporation may be made by
delivery of process to “its general manager in this state.”100 In
Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., the California Supreme Court
interpreted a predecessor provision of the California Corporations
Code to provide that a nonexclusive sales agent qualified as a
“general manager in this State” for service of process.101 The court
noted that “‘every object of the service is obtained when the agent
served is of sufficient character and rank to make it reasonably certain that the defendant will be apprised of the service made,’ and by
service on such an agent, ‘the requirement of the statute is answered.’”102 The court concluded that the sales representative “would
have ample regular contact with Smith & Wesson and would be of
‘sufficient character and rank to make it reasonably certain’ that
Smith & Wesson would be apprised of the service of process.”103
More recently, in Yamaha Motor Co. v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal applied Cosper to hold that a foreign corporation’s U.S. subsidiary and exclusive distributor was its “general
manager” for service of process, noting that it was “doubly reasonably certain Yamaha-America will apprise Yamaha-Japan of any
service in California.”104 Because California law permitted substituted service on a domestic subsidiary, the court concluded that the
Hague Service Convention did not apply.105

required, reasoning that “if actual notice were sufficient, every domestic subsidiary would be
a managing or general agent of its foreign parent.” Id. at *7.
100. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2110 (West 2021).
101. 346 P.2d 409, 413-14 (Cal. 1959).
102. Id. at 413 (quoting Eclipse Fuel Eng’g Co. v. Superior Ct., 307 P.2d 739, 745 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957)).
103. Id. at 413-14 (quoting Eclipse Fuel, 307 P.2d at 745).
104. 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 501 (Ct. App. 2009). The Court of Appeal questioned whether
Cosper was correctly decided: “The phrase ‘general manager in this state’ implies a real
presence in the state of a person who has some real control over the corporation being served.”
Id. at 502. But the court concluded that it was bound by stare decisis to follow Cosper. Id.
105. Id. at 498-99; see also Sweikhart v. Akebono Brake Indus. Co., B305065, 2021 WL
193311, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2021) (holding that substituted service on a domestic
subsidiary was proper under California law and that the Hague Service Convention did not
apply). Federal courts have repeatedly applied Yamaha to hold that substituted service on an
affiliated company was proper under California law and that the Hague Service Convention
did not apply. See, e.g., Xun v. Daimler AG, No. 19-CV-02405, 2020 WL 6784526, at *1-2 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 3, 2020).
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California’s test for substituted service is more liberal than
Illinois’s or Massachusetts’s. California’s test can be satisfied by a
nonexclusive agent, whereas Illinois and Massachusetts look for
indications of common ownership and control. But all three states
focus on the same question—whether service on the affiliated
company is reasonably certain to provide notice to the defendant.
Illinois requires a relationship “so close that it is certain that [the
defendant] ‘was fully apprised of the pendency of the action.’”106
Massachusetts requires “a sufficiently close relationship between
a United States entity and a foreign entity such that service upon
the United States agent is sufficient to provide notice to the foreign
defendant.”107 And California holds that “every object of the service
is obtained when the agent served is of sufficient character and
rank to make it reasonably certain that the defendant will be apprised of the service made.”108 Given the purposes of service of
process, this is the right question.
The test for whether an affiliated company is an agent for service
of process need not be the same as the tests for whether an affiliated
company is an agent for jurisdiction or for substantive liability. In
Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]gencies
... come in many sizes and shapes: ‘One may be an agent for some
business purposes and not others so that the fact that one may be
an agent for one purpose does not make him or her an agent for
every purpose.’”109 In the context of personal jurisdiction, Daimler
even suggested that the agency test might be different for specific
jurisdiction than for general jurisdiction.110 And some courts apply
a “less stringent” veil-piercing test for personal jurisdiction than for
substantive liability.111

106. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (quoting Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Can., 466 N.E.2d 217, 233 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984)).
107. Heffernan v. Robeco Inv. Mgmt., Inc., No. 07-2116-BLS2, 2007 WL 3244422, at *10
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2007) (quoting Sankaran v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., No. 97 Civ.
8318, 1998 WL 433780, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998)).
108. Cosper, 346 P.2d at 413 (quoting Eclipse Fuel, 307 P.2d at 745).
109. 571 U.S. 117, 135 (2014) (quoting 2A C. J. S., Agency § 43 (2013)).
110. Id. at 135 n.13.
111. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 546 (5th Cir.
2014) (quoting Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1198 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 58-62 (discussing jurisdictional veil piercing).
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Whether an affiliated company should be deemed an involuntary
agent for service of process should not turn on factors relating to
substantive liability or personal jurisdiction but rather on factors
relating to service. As discussed above in Part II, the key question
with respect to service is whether notice is “reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.”112 That is the approach that California, Illinois,
and Massachusetts have taken.113
Allowing substituted service on affiliated companies does not
undermine the Hague Service Convention. As noted above, the Convention aims to ensure that documents to be served are “brought to
the notice of the addressee in sufficient time.”114 When this requires
the transmission of documents abroad, the Convention provides a
“simpl[e] and expedit[ed]” procedure.115 But when service on an
affiliated company within the forum state will provide notice to the
defendant, it is not necessary to require compliance with the
Convention’s procedures in order to accomplish the Convention’s
goals.
IV. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON STATE OFFICIALS
State laws permitting substituted service on state officials are
more widespread than state laws permitting substituted service on
affiliated companies. They are also more problematic. Many of these
statutes expressly require that the state official or the plaintiff send
a copy of the service to the defendant, and courts typically interpret
such requirements as making the Hague Service Convention applicable. But some courts have held that service is complete when
the state official is served. Moreover, some statutes do not expressly
require transmittal to the defendant. Such statutes represent an
American version of the system of notification au parquet that the
112. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citing Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Priest v. Las Vegas,
232 U.S. 604 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900)).
113. It may well be that service on a nonexclusive sales agent, as in Cosper, would not meet
this standard. But service on a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign company, as in Yamaha,
Schlunk, and Heffernan, typically would.
114. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.
115. Id.
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Hague Convention’s drafters wanted to abolish. They also raise serious problems under the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Before considering those problems, however, it is necessary to
survey the statutory landscape.
A. The Statutory Landscape
Every state permits substituted service on state officials in at
least some circumstances. As summarized in Table 2 below, forty
states permit substituted service on foreign corporations that are
registered or authorized to do business in the state (the terminology
varies), typically when the corporation withdraws from the state,
has its registration revoked, or when the appointed agent cannot be
found and served. Seventeen states permit substituted service on
unregistered foreign corporations doing business in the state. And
twenty states have provisions in their long-arm statutes or rules of
procedure that permit substituted service on unregistered corporations, registered corporations, or both.
Finally, every state permits substituted service on nonresident
motorists and/or specific businesses ranging from agents for college
athletes to snowmobile operators. Typically, the provisions for registered and unregistered corporations, as well as the long-arm
statutes, include an express requirement that the state official send
a copy of the service to the defendant. The provisions dealing with
nonresident motorists and specific business are less consistent.
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Table 2. Substituted Service on State Officials
LongArm
Statutes

Motorists or
Particular
Businesses
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Registered
Corporations
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

Unregistered
Corporations
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
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New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Registered foreign corporations are often covered by statutes
permitting substituted service on state officials. All fifty states
require foreign corporations doing business in the state to register
with the secretary of state or some other state official.116 When such
corporations register, they must appoint an agent for service of
process.117 Many states permit substituted service on the secretary
of state or another state official when a foreign corporation’s
registration is withdrawn or revoked.118 Some states additionally
116. See Benish, supra note 12, at 1647-61 (listing registration statutes in all fifty states).
117. See id. at 1625 & n.103, 1647–61 (noting all fifty states require appointment of an
agent for service of process).
118. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.765 (2021) (revocation); id. § 10.06.780(4) (withdrawal); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1520(G) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 10-1531(D) (revocation); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-27-1520(c) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 4-27-1531(d) (revocation); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2114(b) (West 2021) (surrender); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-932(c) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 33936(d) (revocation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 381(c) (2021) (withdrawal); FLA. STAT.
§ 607.1520(2) (2021) (withdrawal); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1520(c) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 14-
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provide for substituted service on state officials if the registered
foreign corporation fails to appoint an agent or if that agent cannot
be found or served.119 The widely adopted ABA Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA) seems to be responsible for these provisions in many states, particularly the provisions dealing with
withdrawal and revocation.120 But some states have adopted the
2-1531(d) (revocation); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-451(b)(3) (2021) (withdrawal); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/13.45(a)(3) (2021) (withdrawal); id. 5/5.25(b)(5) (revocation and withdrawal); IND.
CODE § 23-0.5-5-11(e) (2021) (revocation); IOWA CODE § 490.1520(3) (2021) (withdrawal); id.
§ 490.1531(4) (revocation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A.9-060(4) (West 2021) (withdrawal); id.
§ 14A.9-080 (revocation); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:312(A)(4) (2021) (withdrawal); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1521(2)(C) (West 2021) (withdrawal); id. § 1532(4) (revocation); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 156D, § 15.20(c) (2021) (withdrawal); MINN. STAT. § 5.25(4)(a) (2021) (withdrawal
and revocation); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-15.20(c) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 79-4-15.31(d)
(revocation); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.596(3) (2021) (withdrawal); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-14504(3) (2021) (withdrawal and termination); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:15.20(c) (2021)
(withdrawal); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-8(2)(c) (West 2021) (withdrawal); id. 14A:13-10(4)
(revocation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-15(A)(4) (2021) (withdrawal); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 1303 (McKinney 2021) (annulment); id. § 1310 (surrender); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55D-33(b)
(2021) (withdrawal); id. § 55-15-20(c) (revocation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-140(1)(d) (2021)
(withdrawal); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.19 (LexisNexis 2021) (cancellation); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1135(C) (West 2021) (withdrawal); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.731(2)(b) & (d) (2021)
(revocation and withdrawal); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410(b) (2021) (revocation); id. 7-1.21412(a)(4) (withdrawal); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-15-200 (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 33-15-310(e)
(revocation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1531.1 (2021) (revocation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4815-104(b) (2021) (withdrawal and revocation); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.251(2)(A) (West
2021) (revocation); id. § 9.011(b)(5)(B) (withdrawal); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 15.20 (2021)
(withdrawal); id. § 15.30(d) (revocation); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-767(A)(4) (2021) (withdrawal);
id. § 13.1-769(E) (revocation); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23.95.530(3) & 23.95.450(4) (2021)
(withdrawal); W. VA. CODE § 31D-15-1520(c) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 31D-15-1531(d)
(revocation); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1520(c) (2021) (withdrawal); id. § 17-16-1531(d)
(revocation).
119. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.175(b) (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1510(B) (2021); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2111(a) (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 376(b) (2021); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5.25(b)(1)-(2) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931(g) (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:1504(B) (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 15.10(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 5.25(4)(a) (2021);
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.380 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-14-504(2) (2021); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 304(a) (McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55D-33(b) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1001.1-13(3)(c)-(d) (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.19 (LexisNexis 2021); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 60.731(2)(a) (2021); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410(b) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-15-104(b)
(2021); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.251(1) (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-766(B)
(2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.95.450(4) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 31D-15-1510(d) (2021).
120. According to the ABA, thirty-four states have enacted a version of the MBCA. See
Corp. Laws Comm., MBCA Enactment Map, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/business_law/committees/corplaws/ [https://perma.cc/V3FF-V7EY]. The 2010 MBCA
and earlier versions provided for substituted service on the secretary of state in cases of
withdrawal and revocation. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 15.20(c), 15.31(d) (2010) (AM. BAR
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MBCA without providing for substituted service,121 whereas others
have provided for substituted service without adopting the MBCA.122
The state statutes permitting substituted service on registered
corporations are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Substituted Service on Registered Corporations

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Withdrawal

Revocation

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

Agent Cannot
Be Served
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Obligation
to Send
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

ASS’N). But these earlier versions did not provide for substituted service when the foreign
corporation’s agent could not be served. The 2016 MBCA now provides for substituted service
on the secretary of state when the foreign corporation’s agent cannot be served, in addition
to cases of withdrawal and termination. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 5.04(c) (2016) (AM. BAR
ASS’N). The 2016 MBCA has not yet been widely adopted. See Corp. Laws Comm., supra.
121. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-90-807(1)(b) (2021) (providing for service by mail on
withdrawn foreign entity).
122. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2114(b) (West 2021).

1512
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
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North Dakota
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Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
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Washington
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

As shown in the far-right column of Table 3, most of the states
that permit substituted service on state officials for registered
corporations expressly require that either the plaintiff or the state
official send a copy of the service to the defendant.123 Only three
123. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.175(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-1510(B), 10-1520(G), 10-1531(D) (2021) (commission must send); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 427-1520(c), 4-27-1531(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2114(b)
(West 2021) (“shall be sent”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-929(b) (2021) (secretary of state must
send); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 376(b), 381(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); FLA. STAT.
§ 48.161(1) (2021) (plaintiff must send); id. § 607.1520(2) (secretary must send); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-2-1520(c), 14-2-1531(d) (2021) (plaintiff must send); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-451
(2021) (director must send); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.25(c)(2) (2021) (plaintiff must send); IND.
CODE § 23-0.5-5-11(e) (2021) (secretary of state must send); IOWA CODE §§ 490.1520(3),
490.1531(4) (2021) (secretary of state must send); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931(g) (2021) (stating
that secretary of state must send pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-304(f)); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14A.9-060(4), 14A.9-080 (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-C, §§ 1521(3), 1532(4) (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 156D, §§ 15.10(d), 15.20(c) (2021) (secretary of state must send); MINN. STAT.
§ 5.25(4)(a) (2021) (secretary of state must send); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 79-4-15.20(c), 79-415.31(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.380, 351.596(3) (2021)
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states do not. Louisiana’s corporations code contains no express
requirement to send a copy of the service to the defendant, although
Louisiana’s code of civil procedure does impose such a requirement.124 Washington’s corporations code also contains no express
requirement, but it allows substituted service on the secretary of
state for registered corporations only after service by mail has
failed,125 and service by mail would implicate the Hague Convention before substituted service is even permitted. Finally, New
Mexico’s corporations code requires that a withdrawing corporation
provide an address to which the secretary of state may send a copy
of the process but imposes no express obligation on the secretary to
send the copy.126 As discussed below, courts have interpreted even
those provisions of New Mexico law that do expressly require the
secretary of state to send a copy of the service to the defendant not
to require compliance with the Hague Convention.127 For New
Mexico, the problem lies not in the text of its statutes but rather in
their interpretation.
In addition to the provisions for registered foreign corporations,
seventeen states permit substituted service on state officials for
foreign corporations that do business in the state without registering.128 Fourteen of these states expressly require the plaintiff or the
(secretary of state must send); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-14-504(2)-(3) (2021) (secretary of state
must send); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:15.20(c) (2021) (secretary of state must send); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:13-8(2)(d), 14A:13-10(4) (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 306(b) (McKinney 2021) (secretary of state must send); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55-15-20(c), 55D-33(b) (2021) (secretary of state must send); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-01.113(6) (2021) (secretary of state must send); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.19 (LexisNexis 2021)
(secretary of state must send); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1135(C) (2021) (secretary of state
must send); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.121(3), 60.731(3) (2021) (plaintiff must send); 7 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-1.2-1410(b) (2021) (secretary of state must send); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-15-200, 3315-310(e) (2021) (secretary of state must send); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1531.1 (2021)
(secretary of state must send); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-15-105(a) (2021) (secretary of state must
send); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.253 (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 15.20(c), 15.30(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1-19.1 (2021) (clerk of state corporation commission must send); W. VA. CODE §§ 31D-151510(d), 1520(c), 1531(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-161520(c), 1531(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send).
124. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1262 (2021).
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 23.95.450(4) (2021).
126. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-15(A)(5) (2021).
127. See infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
128. ALA. CODE § 10A-1-7.22 (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.765 (2021); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2111(a) (West 2021) (only if ordered by the court); FLA. STAT. § 607.1502(8) (2021); 805 ILL.
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state official to send a copy of the service to the defendant.129
Vermont does not, but it seems likely that Vermont’s rules of
procedure governing substituted service on the secretary of state
would impose such an obligation.130 In Rhode Island, the plaintiff
must give the defendant only such notice of the substituted service
as the court orders.131 And Alabama’s provision is simply silent.132
The provisions for registered and unregistered corporations
discussed above are typically found in state corporations codes. But
one can find more provisions on substituted service in state procedural rules. As summarized in Table 4, twenty states have longarm statutes or rules of civil procedure authorizing substituted
service on state officials for registered foreign corporations, unregistered foreign corporations, or both.133
COMP. STAT. 5/5.30 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 15.10(b) (2021); MINN. STAT.
§ 5.25(4)(b) (2021); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 307(a) (McKinney 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1001.1-13(3)(a) (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.191 (LexisNexis 2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§ 1136(A) (2021); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.731(2)(c), (e) (2021); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410(c)
(2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-15-104(b) (2021); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.251(2)(B)
(West 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1626 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-758(F) (2021); W. VA.
CODE § 31D-15-1510(e) (2021).
129. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.175(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2111(b)
(West 2021) (secretary of state must send); FLA. STAT. § 48.161(1) (2021) (plaintiff must send);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.25(c)(2) (2021) (plaintiff must send); IND. CODE § 34-33-3-1(b) (2021)
(secretary of state must send pursuant to IND. R. CIV. P. 4.10(2)); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D,
§ 15.10(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); MINN. STAT. § 5.25(6) (2021) (secretary of
state must send); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 307 (McKinney 2021) (plaintiff must send); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-01.1-13(6) (2021) (secretary of state must send); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1703.191 (LexisNexis 2021) (secretary of state must send); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1136(A)
(West 2021) (secretary of state must send); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.121(3), 60.731(3) (2021)
(plaintiff must send); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-15-105(a) (2021) (secretary of state must send);
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.253 (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1-19.1 (2021) (clerk of state corporation commission must send); W. VA. CODE § 31D-151510(e) (2021) (secretary of state must send).
130. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 856 (2021).
131. 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410(c) (2021).
132. ALA. CODE § 10A-1-7.22 (2021). Alabama is also the only state to permit substituted
service on unregistered foreign corporations but not service on registered foreign corporations.
See supra Table 2; supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-58-120(b)(1) (2021); FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (2021); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-4(e)(1)(A) (2021) (for registered foreign corporations only); IOWA CODE § 617.3(2) (2021);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-304(f) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(3)(a)(3) (West 2021); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1262 (2021); MD. R. CIV. P. 2-124(o) (for foreign corporations
required to have a registered agent); MICH. CT. R. 2.105(D)(4) (for foreign corporations who
fail to appoint a resident agent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-20-4(j) (2021) (by order of the clerk
of the court); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.030(1) (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4(II) (2021); N.J.
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Table 4. Long-Arm Statutes and Procedural Rules

Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia

Registered
Corporations
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Unregistered
Corporations
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Obligation to
Send
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

As shown in the far-right column, in nineteen of these states, the
statutes or rules expressly require the plaintiff or the state official
to send a copy of the service to the defendant.134 Maryland is the
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-30.1(b) (West 2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-5 (2021) (foreign corporations
authorized to transact business); id. § 38-1-6 (foreign corporations not authorized to transact
business); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(c)(4) (2021) (after attempting service in person or by
mail); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-245(a) (2021) (foreign corporations not authorized to do
business); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (West 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 855 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(A) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33(a) (2021).
134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-58-120(b)(4) (2021) (secretary of state must send); FLA. STAT.
§ 48.161(1) (2021) (secretary of state must send); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4(e)(1)(A) (2021)
(secretary of state must send); IOWA CODE § 617.3(3) (2021) (plaintiff must send); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-304(f) (2021) (secretary of state must send); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(3)(c)
(West 2021) (secretary of state must send); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1262 (2021)
(secretary of state must send); MICH. CT. R. 2.105(D)(4) (plaintiff must send); MONT. CODE
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only state that does not,135 and Maryland courts have interpreted
the absence of such an express requirement to mean that service is
complete when the state official is served, even if notice is never
sent to the defendant.136
Finally, there are substituted service statutes for nonresident
motorists and for specific kinds of businesses. In 1927, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of substituted service
for nonresident motorists in Hess v. Pawloski,137 and it held the
following year that such statutes must “make a reasonable provision” for communicating notice of the suit to the defendant.138
Today, most states that permit substituted service for nonresident
motorists expressly require that the plaintiff or the state official
send a copy of the process to the defendant.139 Nonresident motorist
ANN. § 25-20-4(j) (2021) (secretary of state must send); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.030(4) (2021)
(plaintiff must send); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:4(II) (2021) (plaintiff must send); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-30.1(c) (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1-5
(2021) (secretary of state must send); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(4)(d) (2021) (secretary of
state must send); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-245(b) (2021) (secretary of state must send); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(b) (West 2021) (secretary of state must send); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 856 (2021) (secretary of state or plaintiff must send); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01329(C)(2) (2021) (secretary of the commonwealth must send); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33(c) (2021)
(secretary of state must send).
135. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-124(o).
136. Rhema, LLC v. Foresite, LLC, No. 1274, 2015 WL 6951145, at *7-9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Nov. 10, 2015) (holding in a domestic case that service on State Department of Assessment
and Taxation under Rule 2-124(o) was sufficient without notice being sent to the defendant).
For discussion of this decision’s implications for the applicability of the Hague Convention,
see infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
137. 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
138. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928).
139. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-58-121(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5263(b)-(c) (2021) (plaintiff must send); FLA. STAT. §§ 48.171, 48.161(1) (2021) (plaintiff must
send); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-12-1, 40-12-2 (2021) (plaintiff must send); IDAHO CODE § 49-2421
(2021) (plaintiff must send); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-301(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-401(b) (2021) (no obligation to send); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 188.020 (West
2021) (no obligation to send); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3474, 13:3475(A) (2021) (plaintiff must
send); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 108(2) (West 2021) (plaintiff must send); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 257.403(a) (2021) (plaintiff must send); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 13-3-63 (2021) (secretary
of state must send); MO. REV. STAT. § 506.210(2) (2021) (no obligation to send); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-3-602 (2021) (no obligation to send); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2(b) (West 2021) (no
obligation to send); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-103 (2021) (no obligation to send); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 253(2) (McKinney 2021) (plaintiff must send); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105(2) (2021)
(commissioner of motor vehicles or plaintiff must send); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-11 (2021)
(no obligation to send); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (2021) (plaintiff must send); 31 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 31-7-7(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-370 (2021) (plaintiff
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statutes have figured in a number of cases against foreign-country
defendants, and courts have held that any requirement that a copy
of the process be sent to the defendant abroad makes the Hague
Convention applicable.140
Every state has at least one statute permitting substituted
service on specific kinds of businesses, but these statutes vary as to
whether they require a copy of the process to be sent to the defendant. For example, twenty states have adopted the Uniform
Securities Act, which provides for substituted service on state officials in civil actions but says that service is not effective unless the
plaintiff sends a copy to the defendant.141 By contrast, the Uniform
Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) provides for substituted service on state
officials without any obligation to forward a copy to the defendant.142
Thirty-three states have adopted the UAAA with this provision
intact,143 but an additional five states have altered or omitted the
or director of department of motor vehicles must send); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-6 (2021)
(no obligation to send); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-203(b) (2021) (secretary of state must send);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.062, 17.063(b) (West 2021) (chairman of Texas
Transportation Commission must send); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-505(2) (LexisNexis 2021)
(plaintiff must send); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 891-92 (2021) (plaintiff must send); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-308 (2021) (no obligation to send); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.040 (2021) (plaintiff
must send); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-31(d) (2021) (secretary of state must send); WIS. STAT.
§ 345.09(2) (2021) (secretary of transportation must send); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-6-301(a)
(2021) (plaintiff must send).
140. Howard v. Krull, 438 F. Supp. 3d 711, 717 (E.D. La. 2020); Larson v. Yoon, 351 P.3d
167, 171 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); Heredia v. Transport S.A.S., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Quinn v. Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147, 154 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996); Curcuruto v.
Cheshire, 864 F. Supp. 1410, 1411 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
141. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 611 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2002); see ALASKA
STAT. § 45.56.650(3) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-80(c) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 485A610(c) (LexisNexis 2021); IDAHO CODE § 30-14-611(c) (2021); IND. CODE § 23-19-6-11(c) (2021);
IOWA CODE § 502.611(3) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a611(c) (2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 16611(3) (West 2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.2611(3) (2021); MINN. STAT.
§ 80A.88(c) (2021); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-71-611(c) (2021); MO. ANN. STAT. § 409.6-611(c)
(West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:6-611(c) (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13C-611(c)
(2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1-611(c) (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-611(c) (2021); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-31B-611(c) (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5611(c) (2021); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 551.611 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-611(c) (2021).
142. UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 3(a) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2000); see
also REVISED UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 3(b) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.
2015).
143. ALA. CODE § 8-26B-3(b) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-16-103 (2021); FLA. STAT.
§ 468.453(5) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-3 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 481Z-3(b) (2021); IND.
CODE § 25-5.2-2-1(a) (2021); IOWA CODE § 9A.103(2) (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.6905(1)
(West 2021); MD. BUS. REG. CODE ANN. § 4-402(a) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 81A.24(1) (2021);
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provision.144 Many states permit substituted service on state officials
for out-of-state insurance companies with an obligation to send a
copy of the process to the defendant.145 The same is true for
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 73-42-5(2) (2021); MO. ANN. STAT. § 436.221(2) (West 2021); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-2603(1) (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 398A.125(2) (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332J:2 (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-14F-3(A); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-b(1) (McKinney 2021);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-87(a) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-15.2-02(2) (2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 820.3(B) (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 702.062(1) (2021); 5 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 3104
(2021); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-74.1-3(a) (West 2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-30(B)
(2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-10-3(a) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2103(b)(3) (2021);
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2051.402(c) (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-87-103(2) (LexisNexis
2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-527(C) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.225.020 (2021); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 30-39-3(a) (2021); WIS. STAT. § 440.9905 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-44-103
(2021).
144. Kansas adopted the substituted service provision but added an obligation to forward.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1518(a) (2021). Colorado and Louisiana adopted the act but added
different provisions on service. COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-16-203 (2021); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:422(B)(1)(f) (2021). And Delaware and Idaho initially adopted the provision but later
repealed it, Delaware in 2012 and Idaho in 2020. 78 Del. Laws c. 376, § 2 (2012); 2020 Idaho
Sess. Laws 281, 283. An additional two states—Connecticut and Illinois—have repealed the
entire act. 2017 Conn. Acts 150 (Reg. Sess.); Act of Sept. 27, 2017, 2017 Ill. Laws 100-0534.
145. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-11-5 (2021) (secretary of state must send); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-401.03(c) (2021) (secretary of state must send); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-25 to -27
(2021) (insurance commissioner must send); FLA. STAT. § 626.909(4) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 431:2-205 (2021) (insurance commissioner must send); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-1206, 41-1207
(2021) (director must send); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/121-6, 5/121-7 (2021) (secretary of state
must send); IND. CODE § 27-4-5-4(b)-(c) (2021) (secretary of state must send); IOWA CODE
§ 507A.6 (2021) (secretary of state must send); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2002(a) (2021) (insurance
commissioner must send); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.11-040(2), 304.3-203(5) (West 2021); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 22:1907 (2021) (secretary of state must send); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 4-206(b)
(West 2021) (insurance commissioner must send); id. § 4-207(b) (West 2021) (secretary of state
must send); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175B, § 2 (West 2021) (insurance commissioner must
send); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.788(3) (2021) (secretary of state must send); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-1-612, 33-1-613(1) (2021) (insurance commissioner must send); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 406-A:5(II) (2021) (insurance commissioner must send); id. § 406-B:5(III) (2021) (secretary
of state must send); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:33-3 (West 2021) (commissioner of banking and
insurance must send); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-8(B) (2021) (secretary of state must send); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-16-35(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-02-10, 26.1-0211 (2021) (secretary of state must send); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6103.9, tit. 12, § 2004(C)(4)(d)
(2021) (secretary of state must send); OR. REV. STAT. § 731.324(3) (2021) (secretary of state
must send); 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-16-1.4 (2021) (secretary of state must send); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-25-510(c) (2021) (secretary of state must send); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-2-503, 56-2504 (2021) (insurance commissioner must send); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 804.107(e) (West 2021)
(no default judgment unless copy is mailed); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-2-309, -310 (LexisNexis
2021) (insurance commissioner must send); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3370(b) (2021) (secretary
of state must send); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-801 (2021) (clerk of the state corporation
commission must send); W. VA. CODE § 33-4-13(b) (2021) (plaintiff must send); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 601.715(4), 601.73(2) (2021) (secretary of state must send).
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charitable organizations and paid solicitors.146 And one finds substituted service statutes, sometimes with an obligation to send and
sometimes not, for an eclectic range of other businesses, including
beer makers,147 carnivals,148 nurseries,149 poultry hatchers,150 snowmobile operators,151 and textbook sellers.152
B. Implications for the Hague Service Convention
One might expect that an express statutory obligation to send a
copy of the process to the defendant would lead to the conclusion
that substituted service under such a statute presents an “occasion
to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad,”
requiring compliance with the Hague Service Convention.153 In a
leading case, Darden v. DaimlerChrysler North America Holding
Corp., for example, the court noted that to serve an unauthorized
foreign corporation under section 307 of New York’s Business
Corporation Law, “a party must serve both the New York Department of State and the foreign corporation at its foreign offices.”154
The court reasoned that because such service “requires the transmittal of a judicial document abroad, the Hague Convention ...
applies and preempts contrary state law.”155 Courts have reached
146. ALA. CODE § 13A-9-71(k) (2021) (requires notice to be sent); ALASKA STAT. § 45.68.080
(2021) (requires notice to be sent); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/5 (2021) (plaintiff must send);
IND. CODE § 23-7-8-8(f) (2021) (stating that secretary of state must send pursuant to IND. R.
CIV. P. 4.10(2)); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172-c(2), 173-c(2) (McKinney 2021) (attorney general or
plaintiff must send); 10 PA. STATE AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 162.16(g)(4) (West 2021) (secretary
of state must send); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-130 (2021) (secretary of state must send); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-101-516(b) (2021) (plaintiff or secretary of state must send); W. VA. CODE
§ 29-19-14 (2021) (secretary of state must send); WIS. STAT. § 202.17(5) (2021) (department
of financial institutions must send); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-12-202(a), 26-3-122(c) (2021)
(insurance commissioner must send).
147. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 61.07 (West 2021) (no obligation to send).
148. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1-15(a)(1) (2021) (plaintiff must send); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-75-1
(2021) (no obligation to send); N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-05-04 (2021) (no obligation to send).
149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-26-110 (2021) (secretary must send).
150. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 69-7-201 (2021) (no obligation to send).
151. N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW § 25.27 (McKinney 2021) (plaintiff must send).
152. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-43-29 (2021) (no obligation to send); MO. REV. STAT. § 170.121
(2021) (no obligation to send).
153. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
154. 191 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
155. Id. (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988)).
As discussed below, the text of section 306 providing for substituted service on an authorized
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similar conclusions interpreting statutes from other states that
require a copy of the process to be sent to a foreign corporation,
including Florida,156 Kentucky,157 Minnesota,158 and Texas.159 As
noted above, courts have also held that nonresident motorist
statutes with an obligation to send a copy of the process to the
defendant “require transmission of documents for service abroad
and accordingly implicate the Hague Convention.”160
On the other hand, courts in Kansas, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina have said that substituted service on a state
official does not require compliance with the Hague Convention
even when statutory language requires a copy of the process to be
sent to the defendant. And decisions in Maryland and New York
suggest that courts there would reach similar conclusions. The
dominant rationale for this position is that service under these
statutes is complete when the state official is served, although other
arguments appear in some of the cases.
corporation is different and might lead to a different result. See infra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text.
156. Vega Glen v. Club Méditerranée S.A., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(interpreting FLA. STAT. §§ 48.161, 48.181 (2021), the state long-arm provisions); McClenon
v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 726 F. Supp. 822, 824-25 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (same).
157. Phoenix Process Equip. Co. v. Capital Equip. & Trading Corp., No. 3:16-CV-00024,
2017 WL 157834, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 13, 2017) (interpreting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210
(2021), the state long-arm provision); Norrenbrock Co. v. Ternium Mexico, S.A. De C.V., No.
13-CV-00767, 2014 WL 556733, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (same); Collins v. Westfreight
Sys., Inc., No. 08-227-KKC, 2009 WL 1036381, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2009) (same).
158. Froland v. Yamaha Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (D. Minn. 2003)
(interpreting MINN. STAT. § 5.25 (4), (6) (2021), which provides for substituted service on
authorized foreign corporations and other foreign corporations doing business in the state);
see also IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gree USA, Inc., No. CV 18-1313, 2018 WL 6605896, at *3
(D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2018) (citing Froland, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1007) (same).
159. Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Nokia Sols. & Networks US LLC, No. 18-cv-00412, 2019 WL
8137134, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2019) (interpreting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.045 (West 2021), the state long-arm provision); Macrosolve, Inc. v. Antenna Software,
Inc., No. 11-CV-287, 2012 WL 12903085, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2012) (same); see also Wuxi
Taihu Tractor Co. v. York Grp., Inc., No. 01-13-00016-CV, 2014 WL 6792019, at *5 (Tex. Ct.
App. Dec. 2, 2014) (reaching same result without analysis).
160. Howard v. Krull, 438 F. Supp. 3d 711, 717 (E.D. La. 2020) (interpreting LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:3474, 13:3475 (2021)); accord Larson v. Yoon, 351 P.3d 167, 171 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)
(interpreting WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.040 (2021)); Heredia v. Transp. S.A.S., Inc., 101 F.
Supp. 2d 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (interpreting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 253 (McKinney
2021)); Quinn v. Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147, 154 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (interpreting DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 3112, which has since been repealed); Curcuruto v. Cheshire, 864 F. Supp.
1410, 1411 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-12-1, 40-12-2 (2021)).
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The first such decision appears to have been Melia v. Les Grands
Chais de France, interpreting a provision of Rhode Island’s corporations code.161 Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
previously held that service on a foreign corporation must always be
made through the Hague Convention,162 Melia held that this Rhode
Island decision did not survive Schlunk.163 Having wiped the slate
clean, the Melia court reasoned that “[a]lthough the statute requires the secretary of state to forward notice to the defendant
corporation, other states with similar statutes have interpreted the
statutes to mean that service is complete when the secretary is
served.”164 The court also seemed to draw a distinction between
statutes requiring the plaintiff to give notice to the defendant and
statutes requiring the state official to do so, suggesting that compliance with the Hague Convention was necessary only when the
statutory obligation fell on the plaintiff.165
The next case was Brand v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., involving a Kansas long-arm provision for service on registered and
unregistered corporations.166 Although Brand did not formally
decide the question because the plaintiff had not shown that the
161. 135 F.R.D. 28, 30-32 (D.R.I. 1991) (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS 7-1.1-108, now codified
as 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410 (2021)). Although the court cited an earlier case involving
South Carolina’s long-arm statute for the proposition that service is complete when the state
official is served, see id. at 32 (citing Hammond v. Honda Motor Co., 128 F.R.D. 638, 642
(D.S.C. 1989)), the cited case did not in fact reach the question, finding insufficient evidence
that the secretary of state had been properly served in the first place; see Hammond, 128
F.R.D. at 643. For discussion of a more recent decision interpreting the same South Carolina
statute and reaching the same result as Melia, see infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
162. Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130, 132 (R.I. 1985).
163. Melia, 135 F.R.D. at 30.
164. Id. at 32 (citing Hammond, 128 F.R.D. at 642). In fact, Rhode Island’s statutory
requirement to forward notice applied only to corporations authorized to do business in the
state. See 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410(b) (2021). For corporations carrying on business
without authorization, such as the defendant in Melia, subsection (c) has no similar
requirement and requires the plaintiff to provide only such notice to the defendant as the
court orders. See id. § 7-1.2-1410(c).
165. Melia, 135 F.R.D. at 32 (“Thus, because the statute does not require that plaintiff mail
notice directly to the defendant in addition to the service on the secretary of state, service
may be completed without the transmission of documents abroad and the Hague Convention
does not apply.”). This distinction finds no support in the Hague Convention, the applicability
of which turns on whether “there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document
for service abroad,” and not on who does the transmitting. Hague Service Convention, supra
note 6, art. 1.
166. 920 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Kan. 1996) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-304(f) (2021)).
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defendant was doing business in Kansas, the court stated in dictum
that it would have found “the Hague Convention [to be] inapplicable
as service is complete when the secretary of state is served.”167 The
court offered no reason for rejecting the defendant’s argument that
“the Hague Convention still applies as [the statute] still requires the
transmittal of documents abroad.”168
In Solis v. Gilles, a court in New Mexico adopted a similar interpretation of that state’s long-arm provision for foreign corporations
authorized to do business when their designated agent cannot be
found.169 The New Mexico statute provided that “[w]ithin two days
after service upon the secretary of state, the secretary shall notify
the corporation of service of process by certified or registered mail
directed to the corporation at its registered office and enclose a copy
of the process or other paper served,”170 but the court made no
mention of this provision. Instead, the court simply concluded that
“[b]ecause service of process on [the defendant] was accomplished
when the Secretary of State was served, the Hague Convention does
not apply.”171
Solis’s holding finds support in earlier New Mexico cases that the
court did not cite—cases that distinguish between registered and
unregistered foreign corporations. In a 1935 decision, Silva v.
Crombie & Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the
predecessor of the statute at issue in Solis to provide that substituted service was still effective if the secretary of state failed to send
the process to the defendant.172 The court found decisive language
in the statute making substituted service “effective to all intents
and purposes as if made upon the president or head officers of the
corporation.”173 And the court added that “[i]f the Legislature had
167. Id. at 1172 n.7 (citing Melia, 135 F.R.D. at 32; Hammond, 128 F.R.D. at 642).
168. Id. at 1172; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-304(f) (2021) (requiring the secretary of state
to “promptly forward a copy” of the process to the defendant).
169. No. 10-CV-952, 2011 WL 13284657 (D.N.M. July 5, 2011) (interpreting N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1-5 (2021)).
170. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-5(B) (1993).
171. Solis, 2011 WL 13284657, at *9 (citing Brand v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 920 F.
Supp. 1169, 1172 n.7 (D. Kan. 1996); Melia v. Les Grands Chais de Fr., 135 F.R.D. 28, 32-35
(D.R.I. 1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 706-07 (1988)).
172. 44 P.2d 719, 719-20 (N.M. 1935) (interpreting N.M. COMP. STAT. 1929, § 32-150, now
codified as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-5 (2021)).
173. Id. at 720. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-5(A) (2021) (“[T]he [substituted] service shall
be as effective to all intents and purposes as if made upon an officer, director or the registered
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desired to make the service effective only when the secretary of
state had notified such corporation, it could have so stated in plain
language” and that “[t]he neglect of the secretary of state is not
chargeable to the [plaintiff].”174 By contrast, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals held in Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc. that substituted
service under the long-arm provision for a foreign corporation not
authorized to do business in the state was not effective unless the
defendant received notice from the secretary of state.175 The critical
difference for the court was that authorized foreign corporations
have a statutory obligation to appoint an agent for service of
process, and “if the corporation failed to comply with the terms of
the statute in this regard, it could not complain that the service
provided for in lieu of the appointment of an agent was insufficient
to give it notice.”176 Unauthorized corporations, which have no such
obligation, could not similarly be blamed for failing to maintain an
agent and were still entitled to notice.177 Although neither Silva nor
Abarca involved the applicability of the Hague Convention, they
suggest a possible distinction between registered corporations that
are required to appoint agents—as in Solis—and non-registered
foreign corporations that are not.178
Most recently, in Peake v. Suzuki Motor Corp., the court interpreted South Carolina’s long-arm statute providing for service on
foreign corporations not authorized to do business in the state as not
requiring compliance with the Hague Convention.179 In language
that is typical of the statutes that this Part has been discussing, the
statute provided in part:
Service of the process is made by delivering to and leaving with
the Secretary of State, or with any person designated by him to
receive such service, duplicate copies of the process, notice, or
demand. The Secretary of State immediately shall cause one of
agent of the corporation.”).
174. Silva, 44 P.2d at 720.
175. 738 P.2d 519, 519-20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-6
(2021)).
176. Id. at 520.
177. Id.
178. For discussion of a similar distinction in New York law, see infra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text.
179. No. 19-cv-00382, 2019 WL 5691632, at *5-8 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2019).
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the copies to be forwarded by certified mail, addressed to the
corporation either at its registered office in the jurisdiction of its
incorporation, its principal place of business in the jurisdiction,
or at the last address of the foreign business or nonprofit
corporation known to the plaintiff, in that order.180

First, the court reasoned that the “plain language” of the first
sentence of the quoted provision established that service was
complete when delivered to the secretary of state.181 Second, the
court found support for this interpretation in another subsection of
the long-arm statute providing that the defendant’s refusal to accept
delivery of a copy sent by the secretary of state would not affect the
validity of the service.182 Third, the court relied on the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute, in a case
involving the effective date of service, “that ‘once a summons and
complaint are delivered to the secretary of state, service is complete,
regardless of whether the corporation actually receives notice of the
suit.’”183 Finally, the court construed the secretary of state’s obligation to forward a copy of the process not as “a requirement to
effectuate service” but rather as a means “to provide additional
notice.”184
Although the decisions from Kansas, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina just discussed are the only ones interpreting
statutes providing for substituted service on state officials to avoid
the Hague Service Convention, Maryland and New York are also
worth discussing. Maryland and New York have not held specifically
that the Hague Convention does not apply to substituted service on
registered corporations, but their decisions in other contexts raise
the possibility that they might do so in the future.
Maryland courts have held in interstate cases that substituted
service on the State Department of Assessment and Taxation under
Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-124(o), which applies to foreign
corporations required to maintain a resident agent, is effective even
if the defendant did not receive a copy of the process.185 The court
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-245(b) (2021).
Peake, 2019 WL 5691632, at *7.
Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-245(c) (2021)).
Id. (quoting Holman v. Warwick Furnace Co., 456 S.E.2d 894, 896 (S.C. 1995)).
Id. at *8.
Rhema, LLC v. Foresite, LLC, No. 1274, 2015 WL 6951145, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
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quoted an earlier Maryland case, which in turn quoted the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Silva.186 If Maryland Rule 2-124(o), like
New Mexico’s long-arm statute for authorized foreign corporations,
does not require the sending of process to the defendant to be
effective, it is difficult to see how Maryland’s rule would implicate
the Hague Convention.
In New York, as noted above, courts have held that service on an
unauthorized corporation under section 307 of New York’s Business
Corporation Law requires the transmittal of a judicial document for
service abroad and therefore also requires compliance with the
Hague Convention.187 But service on a corporation authorized to do
business in New York is governed by a different provision—section
306—with different language. Although section 306 provides that
“[t]he secretary of state shall promptly send one of such copies [of
process] by certified mail, return receipt requested, to such corporation,” it also states that “[s]ervice of process on such corporation
shall be complete when the secretary of state is so served.”188 In
Flick v. Stewart-Warner Corp., the New York Court of Appeals
distinguished section 306 from section 307, holding that whereas
service under section 307 was not effective unless the plaintiff sent
a copy of the process to the defendant, “service [under section 306]
on the Secretary of State as the foreign corporation’s designated
agent is the equivalent of actual service on the foreign corporation.”189 Although Flick was an interstate case, New York’s
Appellate Division has similarly distinguished between section 306
and section 307, suggesting in dictum that service under section 306
would not require compliance with the Hague Convention, whereas
service under section 307 would.190
In sum, although many courts have held that a statutory
obligation to send a copy of the process to the defendant implicates
Nov. 10, 2015).
186. Id. (quoting Barrie-Peter Pan Schs., Inc. v. Cudmore, 276 A.2d 74, 77 (Md. 1971)).
187. See Darden v. DaimlerChrysler N. Am. Holding Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
188. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 306(b)(1) (McKinney 2021).
189. 555 N.E.2d 907, 910 (N.Y. 1990). The court contrasted section 306(b)’s provision that
service is effective when the secretary of state is served with section 307(c)’s provision that
service is not effective until ten days after the plaintiff files papers with the clerk of the court
showing that a copy of the process has been sent to the defendant. Id.
190. Vazquez v. Sund Emba AB, 548 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 n.4 (App. Div. 1989).
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the Hague Convention, some courts have decided the other way.
Courts in Maryland, New Mexico, and New York distinguish between registered and unregistered corporations, suggesting that
compliance with the Hague Convention is required for unregistered
corporations but not for registered ones.191 Courts interpreting the
laws in Kansas, Rhode Island, and South Carolina have said more
broadly that compliance with the Hague Convention is not required
for either registered or unregistered corporations.192 Moreover, some
of the arguments found in the cases discussed above would apply to
statutes in the numerous other states where courts have not yet
addressed the question. Many substituted service statutes have
provisions stating that service is effective when the state official is
served, which New York courts have found significant.193 And even
in the absence of such a provision on effectiveness, it would often be
possible to argue that sending a copy of the process to the defendant
is not part of the service itself but rather a means “to provide
additional notice.”194
The possibility that statutes permitting substituted service on
state officials might be interpreted not to require compliance with
the Hague Convention is problematic both because it runs against
the desire of the Convention’s drafters to eliminate the practice of
notification au parquet and because it raises due process concerns.
The next Section considers these objections.

191. See Rhema, 2015 WL 6951145, at *8 (interpreting MD. R. CIV. P. 2-124(o) for foreign
corporations required to maintain a resident agent); Solis v. Gilles, 10-CV-952, 2011 WL
13284657, at *9 (D.N.M. July 5, 2011) (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-5 (2021) for
corporations to do business in the state); Flick, 555 N.E.2d at 910 (distinguishing section 306
for serving registered corporations from section 307 for serving unregistered corporations).
192. Peake v. Suzuki Motor Corp., No. 19-cv-00382, 2019 WL 5691632, at *7-8 (D.S.C. Nov.
4, 2019) (interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-245 (2021) for unregistered corporations); Brand
v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1169, 1172 n.7 (D. Kan. 1996) (interpreting KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-304(f) (2021) for registered and unregistered corporations); Melia v. Les
Grands Chais de Fr., 135 F.R.D. 28, 32 (D.R.I. 1991) (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS 7-1.1-108,
now codified as 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1410 (2021), for registered and unregistered
corporations).
193. See Flick, 555 N.E.2d at 910; Vazquez, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 731 n.4.
194. Peake, 2019 WL 5691632, at *8.
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C. Notice Concerns
One of the aims of the Hague Convention was to eliminate
notification au parquet.195 This method of service, used in some civillaw countries, permits effective service by depositing documents
with a government official or posting them on the notice board of the
court seized.196 According to Schlunk, when the Convention was
drafted, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, and Italy
permitted some version of notification au parquet.197 The fact that
states in the United States similarly permitted substituted service
on state officials—an American version of notification au parquet—seems to have largely escaped attention, both at the time of
the Convention’s drafting and when Schlunk was decided.198
Despite the intentions of its drafters, however, the Hague
Convention did not succeed in abolishing notification au parquet in
either its European or its U.S. manifestations. The principle that
forum law determines whether there is occasion to transmit documents for service abroad, adopted in Schlunk and now endorsed by
the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference,199 necessarily
leaves open the possibility that a country might define substituted
service on a state official to be complete without any obligation to
give notice to the defendant. The Permanent Bureau has acknowledged this fact. Commenting on the Convention’s provisions on
default judgments,200 the Permanent Bureau wrote: “[T]he Convention ... does not do away with notification au parquet ... , but aims
to protect a defendant from the potentially detrimental effects of
195. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 703 (1988) (“There is
no question but that the Conference wanted to eliminate notification au parquet.”); PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 31, ¶ 2 (noting that one of the “main criticisms of the existing system”
was “the survival of notification au parquet and its detrimental consequences for defendants”).
196. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 31, ¶ 8 (describing notification au parquet).
197. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 703. France abolished notification au parquet in 2005. PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 31, ¶ 10.
198. But cf. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting statement by
Philip W. Amram in S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1967), that the Convention
may require “a minor change in the practice of some of our States in long-arm and automobile
accident cases” where “service on the appropriate official need be accompanied only by a
minimum effort to notify the defendant”).
199. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
200. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, arts. 15-16; see also supra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text (discussing these provisions).
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such a system.”201 Although the Supreme Court in Schlunk technically left open the question “whether the Convention applies to
notification au parquet,”202 one must conclude that the answer to
that question is no.
But even if substituted service on a state official without notice
to the defendant does not violate the Hague Convention, it may still
violate the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Part II
argued that when substituted service is made on a state official, due
process requires that either the plaintiff or the state official send a
copy to the defendant. Mullane held that a “fundamental requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”203
The Convention applies only when a defendant’s address is
known,204 and under those circumstances, the alternatives provided
by the Convention become constitutionally required as alternatives
that are far better calculated to provide notice to the defendant than
mere service on a state official.205 Under Mullane, it makes no
difference whether the defendant is a registered corporation required to appoint an agent for service or not. The fact that a foreign
corporation has registered does not make service under the
Convention any less of an alternative,206 and the Supreme Court has
held that “a party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its interests
does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation.”207
The implications of this argument are simple but important.
Schlunk held that “[w]here service on a domestic agent is valid and
complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause, our
201. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 31, ¶ 9. However, as noted above, the Permanent
Bureau acknowledges that Articles 15 and 16 only apply if the Convention does. See id. ¶ 10;
see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
202. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 704.
203. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Schlunk,
486 U.S. at 705 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
204. Hague Service Convention, supra note 6, art. 1 (“This Convention shall not apply
where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.”).
205. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
206. See supra text following note 75.
207. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983); accord Jones v.
Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006) (“The Commissioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to
comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address updated forfeits his right to
constitutionally sufficient notice, and we agree.”).
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inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications.”208 But
if the Due Process Clause requires the transmission of documents
abroad, then service is not complete until this is done. It does not
matter whether the state statute contains an express obligation on
the plaintiff or the state official to send a copy of the process to the
defendant, whether the statute provides that service is effective
when the state official is served, nor whether the foreign corporation
is registered or unregistered. When substituted service is made on
a state official, due process requires that a copy of the process be
sent to the defendant, and that requirement alone makes the Hague
Service Convention applicable.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the applicability of the Hague Service
Convention depends on state law. But state law is subject to the
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires notice reasonably calculated to inform the
defendant of the action. This due process requirement has different
implications for substituted service on affiliated companies and for
substituted service on state officials.
Schlunk held that substituted service on an affiliated company
could be used to serve a foreign defendant within the United States,
making the Hague Convention inapplicable. There was no question
of notice being constitutionally insufficient in Schlunk because
Illinois permits such service only when the relationship between the
companies is so close that notice to the defendant is certain.
California and Massachusetts have adopted similar approaches.
Because these approaches focus on the purposes of service, they
make more sense than the veil-piercing approaches in other states
that turn on factors unrelated to notice.
Substituted service on state officials has very different constitutional implications. Without an obligation on the plaintiff or the
state official to send a copy of the process to the defendant, it seems
highly unlikely that the defendant would learn of the action in
sufficient time to allow it to defend. Many state statutes expressly
require a copy to be sent. But the Constitution imposes such an
208. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 707.
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obligation even when state law does not. The constitutional
obligation to send a copy of the process to the defendant in turn
requires compliance with the Hague Service Convention.
Service of process is just one area in which state law impacts
transnational litigation. And by virtue of Federal Rule 4(e)(1), state
law on service is applicable in federal courts, too. States have
considerable freedom to provide for substituted service within their
borders, thereby avoiding the Hague Service Convention. They
cannot devise an American version of notification au parquet, but
they can and should provide for substituted service on affiliated
companies that is reasonably calculated to provide notice to the
foreign defendant.

